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CRIMINAL LAW-ARE THERE CIRCUMSTANCES
OTHER THAN PROVOCATION WHICH MAY
"REDUCE" M\IURDER TO VOLUNTARY
M ANSLAUGHTER?
Voluntary manslaughter is a degree or species of felonious
homicidei and is a distinct crime.2 It is distinguished from mur
der in that in murder "malice" or "malice aforethought" is
present but is absent in voluntary manslaughter. 3 This offense
has been commonly defined as an intentional killing with provo-
cation and in heat of passion.4 These words have become so as-
sociated, in the minds of students of the law, with voluntary
manslaughter that their accuracv is hardly questioned. They may
well be examined in the light of authority to determine whether
in fact they completely define the crime presently
Though voluntary manslaughter is said to be an intentional
killing, if great bodily harm is intended, the intent requirement
is satisfied."5 But there is some authority which may indicate a
'Boyett v State, 69 Fla. 648, 68 So. 931 (1915) Rhea v. Terr., 3
Okla. Cr. 230, 105 Pac. 314 (1909). I RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS (5th ed. 1853) 579.
State v. Wilson, 166 Iowa 309, 144 N.W 47 (1913), State v.
Brown, 152 Iowa 427, 132 N.W 862 (1911).
*'I RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEIEANORS (5th ed.
1853) 579; 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
1883) 21. Stephen analyzed malice aforethought as:
(a) An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily
harm to, any person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not;
(b) Knowledge that the act or omission which causes death
will probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to
some person, whether such person is the person actually killed
or not,
(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever;
(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice in
arresting or keeping in custody a person whom he has a right
to arrest or keep in custody, or in keeping the peace. 3 STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 22.
Olds v State, 44 Fla. 452, 33 So. 296, 299 (1902) Cottrell v.
Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52, 59, 111 S.W 2d 445, 449 (1937) Com-
monwealth v. Carroll, 326 Pa. 135, 191 Atl. 610, 611 (1937)
Reynolds v. State, 154 Ala. 14, 45 So. 894 (1908), Harrington v
.State, 83 Ala. 9, 3 So. 425 (1888) Commonwealth v. Micuso, 237 Pa.
474, 117 Atl. 211 (1902) Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.)
423 (1821).
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tendency to go further than this and hold negligence sufficient
to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Bishop
states that carelessness (a poorly chosen word for criminal negli-
gence) may supply affirmative criminal intent0 and some courts
seem to have followed his statement.7 What these courts are
really doing is applying a fiction of implied intent, perhaps be-
lieving that the state of mind accompanying negligent conduct
may be just as reprehensible as intent to kill where malice is ab-
sent. For example, the Kentucky court in Ewing v Common-
wealth, after rejecting the doctrine of implied malice from the
use of a deadly weapon quoted Bishop "There is little distinc-
tion in degree between the, will to do a wrongful thing and an
indifference whether it is done or.not. Therefore carelessness I,
criminal, and within limits supplies the place of affirmative
criminal intent."s What these eases really hold is that reckless-
ness in the use of a dangerous agency is the equivalent of an in-
tent to kill.
These cases may not be unsatisfactory in the result reached
since they are confined to situations wherein dangerous instru-
mentalities such as automobiles 9 or firearmso are recklessly
used. It is arguable that the reckless use of such agencies in
some cases occupies a position somewhere between the negligent
murderi and involuntary manslaughter in the degree of crimi-
nality Nevertheless, it is believed that confusion will result in
the scheme of classification of murder and manslaughter if states
of mind other than intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm are
recognized as constituents of the crime of voluntary man-
slaughter and that, consequently such cases belong in the invol-
I BISHOP CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) sec. 313.
State v Moore, 129 Iowa 514, 106 N.W 16 (1906), Hawpe v.
Commonwealth, 234 Ky 31, 27 S.W 2d 394 (1930) Jones v Common-
wealth, 213 Ky 356, 281 S.W 164 (1926) Montgomery v. Common-
wealth, 26 Ky L. Rep. 356, 81 S.W 264 (1904) see Ringer v State,
85 S.W 410, 413 (Ark. 1905) 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed.
1912) 618 (negligent use of dangerous agencies).
Ewing v Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 237, 243, 111 S.W 352, 354-355
(1908)
Jones v Commonwealth, 213 Ky 356, 281 S.W 164 (1926).
"Lambdin v Commonwealth, 195 Ky 87, 241 S.W 842 (1922)
For a case not involving a dangerous agency see Gibson v Common-
wealth, 106 Ky. 360, 50 S.W 532 (1899).
" For a discussion of negligent murder see MORELAND, A RATION-
ALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) Chap. 7.
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untary manslaughter category If the reckless use of a danger-
ous instrumentality is on a footing with intent to kill, why isn't
every homicide from such conduct murder \To mitigating cir-
cumstance is apparent in these cases as, on the contrary, there
often is in a case of an actual intentional killing, e.g.. heat and
passion resulting from provocation. Although one may not ap-
prove of these cases, it must be admitted that they are in'the
law. In fact, Professor Perkins goes so far as to say that. "Many
statements can be found to the effect that voluntary man-
slaughter requires an intentional killing, but the tendency has
been to give the phrase a meaning broad enough to cover any
killing with a man-endangering state of mind that is neither
murder nor innocent homicide. "12
The crux of the inquiry, of course, is the question whether
the offense of voluntary manslaughter may be committed in
the absence of "heat and passion" caused by provocation. Or to
pose the problem differently, are there circumstances other than
provocation which may "reduce" murder to voluntarv man-
slaughter 2 Had the cases in the above paragraph been fully ac-
cepted as sound law by many jurisdictions, the question would
have an immediate affirmative answer. Believing these cases
unsound and not likely to gain headway in American law, the
inquiry must be extended further.
Before this is feasible it is necessary to understand what is
meant by provocation causing murder to be "reduced" to volun-
tary manslaughter. Briefly, provocation may be said to be the
cause of summoning, or stirring up an emotion such as anger.
fear, or resentment 3 resulting in action which is the product of
heat and passion rather than reason.1 4 The test of whether in a
given case adequate provocation occurred is objective, i.e., would
a reasonable man under the circumstances have been provoked 9xr
Though a defendant satisfy this requirement, he must vet prove
that heat and passion were in fact engendered. In such a case
" Perkins, The Law of Homicide (1946) 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 392.
' State v Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 175 Pac. 772 (1917).
"State v. Hill, 20 N.C. 629, 34 Am. Dec. 396 (1839) Maher v.
People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (1862). CLARK & MARSHALL,
LAW OF CRIMES (4th ed. 1940) sec. 254.
" CLARK, CnIM. LAW (3d ed. 1915) sec. 75.
Law--7
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the test is subjective.10 Circumstanc s that have been held to
give rise to adequate provocation are assault and battery,iT
mutual combat,iS unlawful arrest,19 and the detection by a hus-
band of his wife in the act of adultery 20
In these cases the effect of provocation is to produce a state
of mind wnch precludes "malice" necessary for murder, but
the offense is nevertheless felonious. Where, however, the honi-
cide is founded upon the reasonable belief of the necessity of self-
protection. it is a case of self-defense exonerating altogether.2
There are eases which lay down a doctrine of "imperfect self-
defense- by which one who actually killed in self-defense is
considered guilty of manslaughter because of some fault of his
ovwn in bringing on the difficulty, which resulted in the homi-
cide.2 2 In Reed v State, the accused was caught m the act of
adultery with the wife of the deceased and killed the latter to
save his own life. He was convicted of manslaughter, the court
saying, " whenever a party by his own wrongful act pro-
cluces a condition of things wherein it becomes necessary for his
own safety that he should take life or do serious bodily harm,
then indeed the law wisely imputes to him his own wrong, and
its consequences to the extent that they may and should be con-
sidered in determining the grade of offense, which but for such
acts would never have been occasioned. "'23 As stated by another
court. " if he provoked the combat, or produced the occasion
without any felonious intent, the final killing in self-defense will
be mnislaughter only "24 These cases do not discuss provocation
but rather as a matter of policy or from a desire to penalize one
" CLARK. CRIM. LAW (3d ed. 1915) sec. 218; Perkins, The Law of
Homicide, (1946) 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 423.
' State v Joiner, 161 La. 518, 109 So. 51 (1926)
"State v Cassim, 112 WVa. 92, 163 S.E. 769 (1932)
"Plemmons v State, 43 Ga. App. 344, 158 S.E. 630 (1931).
'State v Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50 Atl. 37 (1901)
'Commonwealth v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 42 Atl. 365 (1899)
- Wallace v U. S., 162 U. S. 466, 40 L. Ed. 1039, 16 Sup. Ct. 859
(1895) Freeman v State, 74 Ark. 1035, 298 S.W 333 (1937), Taber
v. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 754, 82 S.W 443 (1904), State v.
Crisp, 170 N.C. 790, 87 S.E. 513 (1910) Reed v State, 11 Tex. App.
509, 518, 40 Am. Rep. 795, 797 (1892) State v Flory, 40 Wyo. 184,
276 Pac. 458 (1929) see Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W 409,
413 (1904) State v Thomas, 184 N.C. 757, 114 S.E. 834, 837 (1922).
- 11 Tex. App. 509, 518, 40 Am. Rep. 795, 797 (1892).
- State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 Pac. 458, 463 (1929)
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who is not without fault, limit the scope of self-defense. In
other words, " ' the law justly limits his right of self-
defense, and regulates it according to the magnitude of his own
wrong.' "25 Thus, as provocation may "reduce" what would
otherwise be murder to manslaughter, fault of the accused in
briming on the necessity of killing another may raise the killing
from what would otherwise be justifiable homicide to voluntary
manslaughter, even though heat and passion be absent. The
reasoning by which the respective results are reached is much
the same.
Similar to the "imperfect self-defense" cases are those in
which the slayer erroneously and unreasonably believed himself
endangered by the deceased.2 6 Some of these cases expressly
state that heat and passion are not always necessary to make out
the offense of voluntary manslaughter.2 7 As stated by one of
them.
"It is not always necessary to show that the killing
was done in the heat of passion to reduce the crnne to
manslaughter, for where the killing is done because the
slayer believes that he is in great danger, but the facts
do not warrant such belief, it may be murder or man-
slaughter according to the circumstances, even though
there be no passion.' '
Other cases, though not expressly stating that heat of pas-
sion due to provocation is not the only circumstance "reducing"
a homicide from murder to manslaughter, do so in effect. Thus
in Commonwealth v Colandro,2 9 the court took the view that
the death of another from a blow struck under the apprehension
of danger which apprehension was not reasonable might consti-
tute manslaughter. Though the defendant relied solely upon self-
defense, not pleading provocation, he was held entitled to an
instruction on manslaughter. Were the apprehension in these
- King v. State, 13 Tex. App. 277, 283 (1882)
2 BURDIcmC, LAW OF CRIME (1946) sec. 461.
'Allison v State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W 409, 413 (1904) State v.
Thomas, 184 N.C. 757, 114 S.E. 834, 837 (1922).
'Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W 409, 413 (1904).
' 231 Pa. 343, 80 Atl. 571 (1911) Accord: Gadd v Common-
wealth, 305 Ky 318, 204 S.W 2d 215 (1947)
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"erroneous belief" cases reasonable, the homicide would have
been committed in self-defense.3
0
The rationalization behind these cases is not revealed within
them. It is believed, however, that they can be justified in the
light of reason and authority Murder is one of the most serious
and heinous crimes known to the law and reveals in the perpe-
trator an unusual callousness of heart. As pointed out by
Stephen in his discussion of murder, "malice aforethought" is
brutal wickedness and a homicide should be judged by the ex-
tent to which the circumstances show brutal ferocity 31 In the
cases under discussion, the killer slew without the brutality
characteristic of a murderer. That is, he killed due to a belief
of danger to himself, erroneous though it may have been, and
not from callousness of heart. Too, one may ask whether these
cases cannot be rationalized as provocation cases. The answer is
no. Provocation cannot be successfully pleaded here for the test,
as we have seen, is objective, and a reasonable man in these
cases would not have held the erroneous belief of danger as did
the accused. Furthermore, the killing may have been done while
the slayer was in full control of his reason which is not true in
cases of provocation resulting in heat of passion. And the magm-
tude of the danger erroneously believed to exist exceeds that
characteristic of the provocation cases. If the belief of danger
were reasonable or the danger actual, the killing would have
been in self-defense.
The rationalization of provocation rendering a homicide
manslaughter and precluding murder is summed up in the state-
ment that it does so because it produces action which is not pri-
marily the product of reason. Authority emphasizes that where
reason is swayed or out of control, the law attributes a slaying
under such a condition to the frailty of human nature and mur-
der is precluded.32 One immediately, therefore, asks if mental
disorder not amounting to legal insanity rendering an accused
SGlass v State, 201 Ala. 441, 78 So. 819 (1918) Minor v. State,
16 Ala. App. 401, 78 So. 317 (1918) Commonwealth v. Miller, 313
Pa. 567, 170 Ati. 128 (1934).
3' 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883)
71-73.
"Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (1862) State
v Hill, 20 N.C. 629, 34 Am. Dec. 396 (1839). CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW
OF CRIMES (4th ed. 1940) sec. 254.
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altogether irresponsible, might not be considered as "reducing"
murder to manslaughter. While it is not contended that such a
view has been accepted to a large extent, there is some authority
for it and its logic is persuasive. In Fisher v. People, the court
was of the opimon that a degree of insanity might reduce from
murder to manslaughter. Said the court, "Though such a state
of mind would not excuse the homicide, it should reduce it to
manslaughter, for deliberation would be absent, and that is es-
sential to constitute murder. "3 In State v Green, the court con-
sidered that the facts were insufficient to cause heat of passion
in the mind of a reasonable person but held that the evidence
that the accused had been wrought up, together with evidence of
mental disorder was sufficient to entitle the defendant to an in-
struction on voluntary manslaughter. It was there said that,
"When insanity is made an issue in a case of homicide, such m-
sanity may have the effect of reducing the homicide to volun-
tary manslaughter. "4 In Davis v State, the defendant was in-
dicted for murder of one whom he had killed while under an
"insane delusion" of an improper relation between his wife and
deceased. The jury found that the defendant knew the differ
ence between right and wrong. Nevertheless, a conviction of
murder was reversed, the court evidently believing that the
offense of vollntary manslaughter had been committed. Said the
court, "How then can malice be imputed to a defendant when
his reason is not merely obscured but has been swept away and
kept away by an insane delusion under which he acts ' How can
such a defendant be guilty of murder while his delusion per-
sigts 9"35 There are many homicide cases in which it is said that
the abnormal mental or emotional conditions of an accused
should be considered.
3 6
- 23 Ill. 218, 232 (1859)
" 78 Utah 580, 6 P 2d 177, 186 (1931)
' 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W 2d 993, 996 (1930)
" Quattlebaum v State, 119 Ga. 433, 46 S.E. 677 (1904)
("epilepsy") Mangrum v Commonwealth, 19 Ky L. Rep. 94, 95, 39
S.W 703, 704 (1897) ("weak or feebleminded") Rogers v Com-
monwealth, 96 Ky 24, 28, 27 S.W 813. 814 (1894) ("feebleminded")
Smith v. Commonwealth, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 224, 227 (1864) ("moral
insanity") Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 221, 81 Am. Dec. 781, 786
(1862) ("peculiar weakness of mind") State v. Adin, 7 Ohio Dec.
(Reprint) 25, 28 (1876) ("insanity, partial or temporary").
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While one may hesitate to agree that the criminal law
should consider mental or emotional conditions other than that
of actual insanity, it is probably true that between the extremes
of sanity and insanity exist many abnormalities3 7 which may
affect the ability to reason and to possess a murderous state of
mind. Law should ally itself with medical science in the pursuit
of a better understanding of the human mind. If it is found
that reason due to disease, etc., may be defective so as to be
similar to its state when, affected by provocation, such should
receive greater legal recognition than it has heretofore. As said
by one court, "It is the condition, no matter how caused, over-
powering and controlling reason, which reduces the offense to
some lesser degree of criminal homicide. ' '38 Perhaps the state-
ment of a distinguished legal writer is a fitting conclusion to
this part of our study
. a technical, legal distinction would probably
be drawn by the courts between the cases where in-
toxication and heat of blood (as factors operating upon
the normal state of mind) are taken to reduce the degree
of the offense, and cases where it is sought to have the
presence of so called partial insanity reduce the degree
of the crime of course such a technical dis-
tinction could not receive much support "
An additional category of the crime of voluntary man-
slaughter is comprised of those cases in which the accused in-
tentionally killed one to prevent a crime not involving vio-
lence. 40 Thus, where the deceased when killed was committing
larceny of the defendant's whiskey,4 ' or larceny of his hay,4 2
the homicide has been held to constitute the crime of voluntary
manslaughter. These cases are not based upon heat of passion
SWeihofen, Partial Insanity And Criminal Intent (1930) 24
ILL. L. R. 505, 508.
Hempton v State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W 596, 601 (1901).
GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925) 203.
See also, Keedy Insanity and Crtm-nal Responsibility (1917) 30
HARV. L. R. 535, 551.
"0Commonwealth v. Beverly 237 Ky 35, 34 S.W 2d 941 (1931)
(Note carefully the instruction drawn by the Court of Appeals. Also
note that the facts show that the defendant killed calmly and in
control of his reason having secreted himself at the scene of the
attempted larceny This probably negatives the idea of "heat and
passion"). see Gray v. Combs, 30 Ky (7 J. J. Mar.) 478, 483, 23 Am.
Dec. 431, 435-436 (1832).
" Howard v Commonwealth, 198 Ky 453, 248 S.W 1059 (1923)
'Bloom v State, 155 Ind. 292, 58 N.E. 81 (1900)
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resulting from provocation. Rather the results seem based upon
the policy of the law to allow some mitigation for the desirea
end of preventing crime as such, or in some cases, as an indul-
gence to the social utility of protecting broperty
It is now proposed to consider together instances of volun-
tary manslaughter which are deemed undeserving of being desig-
nated as acceptable categories of that crime. There are cases
which have taken the view that drunkenness may reduce from
murder to voluntary manslaughter.4 3 Dictum in a later case
qualifies this view by saying drunkenness will reduce from
murder to voluntary manslaughter only in extreme cases. 4 4 It is
believed that such a theory is based upon a confusion of malice
-with nitent. Of course it may be theoretically possible for drunk-
enness to obscure reason while yet not precluding ability to
form an intention to kill. Even if this were capable of scientific
proof, it might be expedient for the law to disallow a plea for
mitigation due to drunkenness, as a matter of policy
Equally as weak as the drunkenness cases, are those cases
which hold that homicide resulting from'resistance to an at-
tempted illegal arrest is reduced to manslaughter as a matter
of law.45 These cases, which hold that illegality of arrest always
reduces murder to manslaughter have been termed "mandatory
manslaughter cases.' 46 Though the reasomng behind them is not
readily apparent, they may be rationalized. As one writer has
said
"Clearly these cases do not concern themselves with
the mental condition of the killer; rather they continue
to focus on the arresting official. Just as he must be
vindicated and protected if acting lawfully, so in a vague
way, he is punished and a deterrent aganist unlawful
arrest is provided in an equally vague way by not
making the taking of his life a supreme offense.'"1 7
"King v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 856, 862 (1891). see Ivory v.
State, 237 Ala. 344, 186 So. 460, 462 (1939) Cagle v State, 211 Ala.
346, 100 So. 318, 320- (1924). Accord: State v. Rumble, 81 Kan. 16,
105 Pac. 1 (1909), Cheadle v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 566, 149 Pac. 919
(1915) see U.S. v. King, 34 Fed. 302, 313 (1888).
"Curlee v. State, 70 Ala. 33, 195 So. 430, 431 (1940).
" Commonwealth v Carey, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 246 (1853) MAYES,
CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 1938) sec. 173.
"Dickey Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest (1933) 18
CORN. L. Q. 373, 379.
'"Dickey, op. cit. supra. n. 46 at 380.
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Such cases do not talk provocation but stress individual
liberty-4s "natural rights of personal liberty and security-
rights held sacred by the common law and recognized and pro-
tected by constitutional enactments. '4 9 While this view of
homicide occurring during the course of illegal arrest is held in
behalf of highly valued individual liberty, it may result in using
liberty unwarrantedly as a shield for murder. While it is said
that "previous or express malice" will result in murder,5 0 there
may be malice at the time of the killing. It is believed that if it
is shown that one who killed during the course of an illegal
arrest was not provoked so as to kill in heat of passion, he i.
guilty of murder.5 1
In conclusion, it should be stated that the law of voluntary
manslaughter is not without confusion and that cases can be
found to prove almost anything. It seems clear that there is a
tendency to broaden intention as a requisite constituent of vol-
untarv manslaughter. Furthermore, to confine "mitigating"
circumstances to provocation is to attempt to confine voluntary
manslaughter within bounds that are too narrow to encompass it.
There are cases such as drunkenness reducing from murder to
manslaughter, and the illegal arrest "mandatory manslaughter
cases" which should not be followed. Finally, the writer pro-
poses the following analysis of voluntary manslaughter
Voluntarv manslaughter is a separate and distinct species
of feloious homicide committed intentionally or with intent to
inflict areat bodily harm under the following circumstances
(1) Provocation resulting in heat of passion,
(2) Necessity for self-preservation but the slayer was at
fault in bringing on the difficulty which necessitated the homi-
cide-' 'imperfect self-defense",
(3) Killing under an erroneous and unreasonable belief
of danger which if real or reasonable would constitute a killing
in self-defense,
Wright v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky 123, 2 S.W 904 (1887).
" Rafferty v. People, 69 Ill. 111, 113, 18 Am. Rep. 601, 602 (1873)
'People v White, 333 Ill. 512, 165 N.E. 168 (1929).
"' State v Cates, 97 Mont. 173, 33 P 2d 578 (1934), see: Roberson
v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535, 539 (1901).
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(4) "Partial insanity' '-reason affected by mental dis-
order not amounting to legal insanity excusing altogether,
though intention to kill existed,
(5) To prevent commission of a non-violent felony
ARNETT MAWN.

